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Online privacy remains an ongoing source of debate in society. Sensitive to this, many 
web platforms are offering users greater, more granular control over how and when 
their information is revealed. However, recent research suggests that information 
control mechanisms of this sort are not necessarily of economic benefit to the parties 
involved. We examine the use of these mechanisms and their economic consequences, 
leveraging data from one of the world's largest global crowdfunding platforms, where 
contributors can conceal their identity or contribution amounts from public display. We 
find that information hiding is more likely when contributors are under greater 
scrutiny or exhibiting “undesirable” behavior. We also identify an anchoring effect from 
prior contributions, which is eliminated when earlier contributors conceal their 
amounts. Subsequent analyses indicate that a nuanced approach to the design and 
provision of information control mechanisms, such as varying default settings based on 
contribution amounts, can help promote larger contributions.  
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Introduction 
Individuals behave differently when they are subject to scrutiny. This fact is well documented across 
numerous contexts. Differences have been reported in everything from physiological responses during 
task performance (Bond and Titus 1983; Izuma et al. 2009), to consumption patterns (Goldfarb et al. 
2012; Ratner and Kahn 2002), generosity (Haley and Fessler 2005) and community participation (Leshed 
2008). These behavioral differences are growing increasingly salient as many transactions and processes, 
previously conducted solely offline, are now shifting online in greater proportion. With the transition to 
the digital realm, both the visibility and traceability of individuals and their actions increase in turn. It is 
therefore unsurprising that demands for online privacy are so prevalent, particularly when one considers 
the frequent attention that privacy breaches have recently received in the mainstream media. Sensitive to 
these issues, many online platforms have responded by providing users with a greater deal of control over 
their information (e.g., privacy controls).  
However, while it is clear that users desire these features, recent work has noted that they are not always 
employed in an optimal manner (Acquisti and Grossklags 2005; Das and Kramer 2013) and, further, that 
their provision and use is not necessarily of economic benefit to all parties involved (Conitzer et al. 2012; 
Hann et al. 2008). In this work, we therefore seek to examine users’ endogenous use of information 
hiding mechanisms and the economic consequences for others (observers). Specifically, we address the 
following research questions: What drives users to employ information hiding mechanisms? 
What are the economic consequences of doing so?   
We address these questions in the context of online crowdfunding, a digital manifestation of charitable 
contribution and entrepreneurial finance. Crowdfunded markets have recently emerged as a viable 
alternative for sourcing capital to support innovative, entrepreneurial ideas and ventures (Burtch et al. 
2013c). As the economic potential of these markets has recently become more apparent, they have 
boomed. Crowdfunding platforms like IndieGoGo, Kickstarter and RocketHub are now facilitating 
extremely large volumes of transactions, in rather sizeable amounts. According to a recent industry 
report, crowdfunding helped new ventures to raise more than $2.7 billion in 2012, and is expected to 
facilitate more than $5 billion in 2013 (Massolution 2013). This explosive growth has resulted in 
significant attention, from both the media and U.S. legislators, as evidenced by President Obama’s recent 
signing of the JOBS Act (2011). 
On a crowdfunding platform, individuals propose projects and members of the crowd fund them in 
whatever increment they wish. When a contribution is made to a campaign, a record is created on the 
campaign’s backer or funder page that contains details that, depending on the platform, variably include 
the identity of the contributor, the size of their contribution, and the timing of that contribution. Given 
the monetary, and thus relatively sensitive, nature of these contribution actions, a number of prominent 
crowdfunding platforms now go to great lengths to provide users with a degree of anonymity. In some 
cases, this is done by randomizing the ordering of contributors, as on Kickstarter, while in others this is 
achieved in a more granular fashion, namely by providing contributors with the option of concealing 
specific pieces of information in the contribution record (i.e., identity or amount). It is this latter, more 
nuanced approach that we consider here. Specifically, we aim to identify the drivers of information hiding 
in particular contribution instances, and the economic consequences of said information hiding – in this 
case the impact upon subsequent contributors.  
This work addresses recent calls for i) attention to design and action in information privacy research 
(Belanger and Crossler 2011), ii) explorations of the antecedents and consequences of privacy concerns in 
online markets (Smith et al. 2011) and iii) examinations of the economics of information hiding and 
privacy online (Pavlou 2011). Further, our work addresses an ongoing need for empirically and 
theoretically informed research, to offer practitioners guidance around crowdfunding regulation, 
oversight and administration (Mollick 2013). 
Our key findings are as follows. First, we find that individuals are more likely to conceal information i) 
when they are privacy sensitive, ii) when the campaign they are supporting has received greater public 
exposure and iii) when their behavior has the potential to be viewed as ‘extreme’ or undesirable by others. 
Second, we find evidence of an interesting tradeoff between an identified anchoring effect, where users 
employ prior others’ contribution amounts as a benchmark for their own contribution, and prior others’ 
information hiding behavior. While we do observe an anchoring effect, reflected by a positive sequential 
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correlation in contribution amounts, that effect is attenuated (indeed, it is effectively eliminated) when 
the prior contributor chooses to conceal the amount of their contribution. 
Examining the marginal effects of prior amount hiding, we find that its application is beneficial for the 
purveyor and fundraisers when prior others contribute in small amounts. In contrast, we find that its 
application is detrimental when prior others contribute in large amounts. This contrast is fairly intuitive, 
as it implies that the purveyor and campaigners only benefit from information hiding when it serves to 
conceal an anchor point from view when that anchor is small and likely to pull down subsequent 
contributions.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We begin with a review of the literatures on 
crowdfunding, online privacy, and individual or consumer information hiding across various contexts. 
Integrating those literatures, we propose a series of empirically testable hypotheses, which motivate our 
econometric models. We then describe our data and study context, before estimating our models and 
reporting our results. We subsequently establish the robustness of those results, offering a description of 
the various ancillary analyses we ran to rule out different threats to validity. Finally, we offer a discussion 
of the implications of our findings and we propose a number of avenues for future research. 
Literature Review 
Crowdfunding 
There is an emerging stream of research that has examined the concept of crowdfunded markets. 
Crowdfunding has been defined as a collective effort by individuals who network and pool their money 
together, usually via the Internet, to invest in or support the efforts of others (Ordanini et al. 2010). These 
markets typically come in one of four flavors: reward-based, loan-based, donation-based and equity-based 
(Burtch et al. 2013a). While there are examples of each around the world, the first three are by far the 
most common. 
Loan- and reward-based crowdfunding markets have seen the most extensive consideration by academics 
to date, with a primary focus upon Prosper.com. Notable examples of such work include that by Lin et al. 
(2013) and Zhang and Liu (2012). These authors have attempted to identify the types of information that 
individuals consider in crowdfunded marketplaces when making contribution decisions. Lin and his 
colleagues conclude that the likelihood of credit being issued is greater when the borrower exhibits greater 
social capital (e.g., a larger social network), as lenders appear to take this as a sign of credibility or 
trustworthiness. Zhang and Liu find, counter to intuition, that lenders are more likely to herd when the 
borrower exhibits signals of low quality. They interpret this as a rational decision, likely made because the 
lender assumes that others have some private knowledge about the borrower that they are not privy to. In 
contrast, when a borrower exhibits high signals of quality, lenders are less likely to join a herd, likely 
because they perceive the herd as simply a reflection of the borrower’s observable quality. Lastly, Lin and 
Viswanath (2013) have recently undertaken a study of distance-based frictions on Prosper, finding 
evidence of a home-bias.  
Agarwal et al. (2011) have examined a similar notion in the context of reward-based crowdfunding, 
focusing on what they refer to as the “flat world hypothesis.” They do so leveraging data drawn from what 
is generally acknowledged to be the earliest successful crowdfunding platform, Sellaband.com, a Dutch-
based marketplace supporting musical artists. These authors similarly find evidence that crowdfunders 
are more likely to contribute when the artist resides in closer proximity. More recently, Mollick (2013) has 
considered the determinants of fundraising success for crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter.com, 
reporting a number of findings of particular usefulness for campaign organizers, including the importance 
of social networks, the role of campaign durations and the impact of the different fundraising target 
amounts. 
With respect to donation- and equity-based crowdfunding, scant empirical research exists. In the equity 
space, Burtch (2011) provides one of the first empirical analyses of investment-style crowdfunding, 
exploring and confirming the notion that greater numbers of uninformed participants can drive an 
increase in herding amongst crowdfunders, to their detriment. Ahlers et al. (2012) study how firm efforts 
at disclosure (e.g., risk assessments) positively impact crowdfunder investment, while Kim and 
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Viswanathan (2013) examine the influence that expert investors have on the contribution decisions of 
other, non-expert crowdfunders. 
Finally, in the donation-based space, Burtch et al. (2013c) present an analysis of social influence in 
contributions to a donation-based crowdfunded market for journalism projects, finding evidence of 
crowding out amongst contributors and demonstrating the importance of organizer marketing effort in 
driving demand for project output. Finally, Burtch et al. (2013b) explore the role of cultural differences 
between lenders and borrowers at Kiva.org, a pro-social lending platform on which crowdfunders support 
entrepreneurs in the developing world. These authors find that contributors exhibit a cultural bias, 
preferring similar others.  
Online Privacy and Information Hiding 
There is a lengthy IS literature dealing with online privacy concerns, their antecedents, as well as their 
implications for online consumer transactions and community participation. We offer a brief review of 
relevant work here, though we also direct the reader to three comprehensive literature reviews of the 
subject, which were recently published in MIS Quarterly (Belanger and Crossler 2011; Pavlou 2011; Smith 
et al. 2011).  
A number of studies have sought to formulate scales to measure online privacy concerns (e.g., Smith et al. 
1996). Malhotra et al. (2004), in particular, derive and empirically evaluate a scale of measurement for 
Internet Users Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC), which has seen extensive application in the 
literature. This scale is rooted in three constructs: collection (of user data), control (on the part of users, 
over their data) and awareness (of policies, again, on the part of users). The authors find support for their 
measurement scale, suggesting that these three factors are highly predictive of privacy concerns online, as 
they each contribute to the formation of trust and the perception of risk on the part of users.  
Nov and Wattal (2009) explore the antecedents and consequences of such information privacy concerns 
in online social networks. The authors find that individuals’ privacy concerns, and in turn sharing 
intensity, are negatively associated with their trust in other members of the social network. More recently, 
Tsai et al. (2011) have conducted a field experiment on an online website, showing that customers are 
more likely to buy products from a website where privacy assurances are displayed in a more prominent, 
visible manner. Hui et al. (2007) report a similar finding based on their own field experiment. Rather 
than product purchases, however, these authors demonstrate that users are more willing to share their 
personal information in the presence of privacy assurances, whether written or in the form of a privacy 
seal.  
Das and Kramer (2013) examine individuals self-censorship on Facebook, finding that, out of 3.9 million 
users, 71% self-censor at least once in a 17-day period. One of the biggest drivers of such behavior is 
reportedly the size of the users’ social network, which drives an exposure effect, wherein users grow more 
concerned with a larger audience. Sleeper et al. (2013a) examine these same behaviors on Facebook, 
conducting interviews with users, who indicate that a primary reason for self-censorship is their inability 
to precisely target a desired audience. These findings are in keeping with earlier studies in the literature, 
which have repeatedly noted information hiding as a primary user response to perceived privacy risks 
(Milne et al. 2004; Son and Kim 2008). 
Anonymity in Consumption and Charity 
As noted earlier, individual behavior has been shown to vary widely when subject to scrutiny. Here, we 
focus on two contexts of direct relevance to our study context: consumption and charitable contribution. 
First, with respect to consumption, Ratner and Kahn (2002) demonstrate via a series of experiments that 
individuals exhibit greater variety seeking behavior in their consumption patterns when they are 
scrutinized by others. The authors argue that this is because subjects expect others to evaluate such 
behavior more positively (i.e., interesting or unique, as opposed to dull and boring). Further, a similar 
effect is reported by Ariely and Levav (2000), who examined subjects when asked to place food and drink 
orders sequentially, amongst a group of peers or independently. Those authors reported increases in the 
variety of orders when subjects were in the presence of scrutiny.  
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Related to this, Goldfarb et al. (2012) report upon two empirical studies that demonstrate how 
individuals’ purchasing behavior is influenced by what they refer to as the potential for embarrassment. In 
their first study, these authors find that customers are more likely to purchase difficult-to-pronounce 
vodka brands when they are made available via a self-service counter (as opposed to a scenario in which 
customers must place a verbal order for the brand with a clerk). In their second study, these authors 
consider changes in the composition of pizza orders following a shift to an online ordering system. The 
authors find that customers are more likely to place complex, fattening pizza orders when using the online 
system.  
Next, considering the literature dealing with charitable contribution, there are numerous studies that 
consider the impacts of anonymity. This literature, largely experimental in nature, has established fairly 
conclusively that individuals become increasingly generous in the face of scrutiny, though in a select few 
cases studies have actually documented a general regression toward the mean. Haley and Fessler (2005), 
conducting a laboratory experiment, have found that subjects respond with generosity in the presence of 
subtle cues of observation (i.e., images of pairs of eyes presented on a computer desktop background). 
Alpizar et al. (2008), conducting a field experiment around donations to a national park, found that 
subjects similarly respond with generosity in the direct presence of a contribution ‘collector’ (as opposed 
to an anonymous donation box). Soetevent (2005) finds that church donations increase when individuals’ 
identities and contribution amounts are revealed via collection using an open basket, rather than a bag.  
This last author attributes the result in the second condition jointly to i) a social comparison effect, and ii) 
the fact that subjects are afforded the opportunity for reputational gains. Importantly, however, 
Soetevent, in formulating his experiment, notes that individuals might generally be expected to regress 
toward the mean (i.e., upward deviation of below average contributors and downward deviation of above 
average contributors). This is because excess contribution, if observed by others, may similarly draw 
negative reactions from peers. It is worth noting here that IS scholars have also found evidence of similar 
behavior in regard to non-monetary contributions. Chen et al. (2010) have found that the rate at which 
users post movie reviews tends toward the average when users are provided with information about 
others’ posting activity, while Zeng and Wei (2013) report that users post similar photos to Flickr shortly 
after they form a social tie1.  
Finally, one additional, important aspect of anonymity worth noting is the moderating role it plays in 
relation to social influence and social comparison. That is, the degree to which individuals respond to 
prior others actions, and the manner in which they respond, has been shown to depend in part on the 
amount and types of information revealed about or by said prior others. Soetevent’s work touches on this 
fact, as noted above. However, other, empirical examples of this behavior are documented by Chen et al. 
(2010) and by Croson and Marks (1998).  
Hypothesis Development 
Bearing the above studies in mind, we begin by considering the expected drivers of information hiding 
behavior. We first anticipate that individuals will be more likely to conceal their information when they 
are privacy sensitive. This expectation perhaps extends most directly from the work of Son and Kim 
(2008), who highlight information hiding in their taxonomy of user responses to privacy concerns. We 
formalize this as hypothesis H1. 
H1 (Privacy Concern Effect): Crowdfunders will be more likely to conceal 
information associated with a contribution when they are privacy sensitive. 
The experimental economics literature has also noted that individuals respond to varying degrees of 
anonymity (Lamba and Mace 2010). Further, privacy risk is of course not a binary variable; rather, 
perceived risks vary in intensity. In particular, the perception of risk is likely to grow stronger with greater 
scrutiny (i.e., more detailed scrutiny or a larger audience). Our expectation in this regard extends from the 
                                                             
1 These authors further find that users subsequently look to differentiate themselves from their social ties, 
after a time, suggesting some important differences in reputational outcomes from unique contribution, 
between monetary and non-monetary settings. 
2 The campaign organizer (rather than the marketplace purveyor) determines the campaign category. As such, there 
are no strict rules around the assignment of categories, thus these groupings are fuzzy and may overlap. 
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findings reported by Das and Kramer (2013), as well as those reported by Sleeper et al. (2013a), noted 
above, regarding Facebook self-censorship. This logic is also similar, though the inverse, of that set forth 
by Zhang and Zhu (2011), who consider increasing reputational gains from contributions to Wikipedia in 
the presence of a larger audience. Taken together, these studies lead us to our second hypothesis. 
H2 (Exposure Effect): Privacy sensitive crowdfunders will grow more likely to 
conceal information as the audience for their actions increases in size. 
Our review of the literature also suggests that scrutiny can drive changes in behavior, conditional on 
having taken action. That is, conditional on contribution, we expect that individuals will be more likely to 
conceal information when said contributions will be perceived as less desirable by others. This 
expectation represents the converse of relationships identified in the literature that has studied the effects 
of exogenous anonymity and identification. In particular, the studies by Ariely and Levav (2000) and 
Ratner and Kahn (2002) show that, under scrutiny, individuals wish to seem more “interesting.” 
Similarly, the work by Goldfarb et al. (2012) suggests that individuals are more likely to purchase 
products when the risk of embarrassment is lower.  
We consider two notable forms of behavior that others might view as embarrassing or undesirable in this 
setting: i) contribution in extreme amounts (Soetevent 2005), and ii) self-contribution (toward one’s own 
campaign). First, we anticipate, based on the above discussion, that information hiding will be more likely 
when individuals’ contributions represent a greater deviation from the norm, and second, we anticipate 
that information hiding will be more likely when an individual is contributing toward their own campaign. 
These expectations are formalized in hypotheses H3 and H4. 
H3 (Extremity Effect): Crowdfunders will be more likely to conceal 
information associated with a contribution when the amount of their 
contribution is extreme. 
H4 (Self-Contribution Effect): Crowdfunders will be more likely to conceal 
information associated with their contribution when they are contributing 
toward their own campaign. 
Our review of the literature also offers a number of results that can inform our study in regard to the 
downstream impacts of information hiding behavior. First, the charity and IS literatures have noted that, 
when possible, social comparison drives similarity in contribution behavior (Chen et al. 2010; Soetevent 
2005; Zeng and Wei 2013). Further, a lengthy stream of literature on the subject of anchoring effects 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and censorship biases (Feiler et al. 2013) suggests that crowdfunders will 
draw on observable cues provided by others when deciding an appropriate contribution amount. Given all 
of the above, we anticipate that crowdfunders will be influenced by the observable contributions of prior 
others, and will tend to contribute in kind, a concept we formalize via hypothesis H5. Further, anchoring 
effects are only possible when prior others’ contributions are observable. As such, we also anticipate that 
these anchoring effects will be moderated by prior others’ decisions about whether to hide the amount of 
their contribution, leading us to hypothesis H6. 
H5 (Anchor Effect): Crowdfunders will contribute in amounts similar to prior 
others. 
H6 (Censorship Effect): The anchor effect (H5) will be weaker when prior 
others’ contributions are concealed. 
These various hypotheses are summarized below, in Figure 1, where we present a conceptual, 
diagrammatical representation of our models. Note that the dashed arrows reflect main effects that we do 
not draw formal hypotheses about, yet which contribute to hypothesized interactions and thus are 
included for the sake of maintaining hierarchical inheritance. 
Study Context 
Our study focuses on one of the leading global platforms for reward-based crowdfunding. This 
marketplace empowers anyone, in any location, to raise money for any venture. The marketplace is highly 
trafficked, facilitating millions of dollars in transactions each month for a wide variety of campaign types. 
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Since founding, the platform has attracted huge numbers of users, representing more than 190 countries 
around the world. Figure 2 presents screenshots from this marketplace. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
 
Campaign Flow 
This marketplace allows submission of any and all ventures, regardless of subject matter (with the 
exception of prohibited / offensive content). Thus, rather than vetting campaign submissions, as is done 
in certain crowdfunding contexts (e.g., Kickstarter), this marketplace operates as a meritocracy, with no 
gate keepers, allowing any and all submissions to be posted. When campaign owners submit their project 
to the marketplace for posting, they must define a number of campaign characteristics. 
These characteristics include the rewards the organizer plans to offer, what the organizer intends to do 
with the money, how much money they are attempting to raise and the planned funding duration. This 
platform earns revenues by charging fees to campaigns, based on the amount of money raised (between 
4% and 9%, plus third party fees associated with payment processing and currency conversion). 
Individual contributors receive their claimed rewards following the completion of the fundraising process 
and project implementation. 
Contribution Flow 
Campaigns are presented to website visitors in order of popularity (measured algorithmically by the 
purveyor, based on organizer effort, contribution activity, media coverage, etc.), though there are a variety 
of filtering and sorting mechanisms available to support campaign search efforts. The home page also 
highlights new campaigns and campaigns that are ending soon. The visitor is presented with the ability to 
filter ongoing campaigns based on location (city) or proximity (“near me”), or by category (e.g., 
technology, small business, causes)2. After selecting a reward, a contributor is then presented with the 
option of hiding their name or the amount contributed. However, a contributor is not able to hide both 
pieces of information simultaneously. Importantly, a contributor’s identity and amount will always be 
viewable to the campaign organizer; the hidden information is masked only from third parties (e.g., other 
contributors). 
                                                             
2 The campaign organizer (rather than the marketplace purveyor) determines the campaign category. As such, there 
are no strict rules around the assignment of categories, thus these groupings are fuzzy and may overlap. 
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Once an individual has decided to contribute to a particular campaign, they must then indicate how much 
they wish to contribute. A contributor will typically have the option of claiming a reward (perk), as 
compensation for their contribution, though rewards are not always offered. Usually, a campaign will 
offer different tiers (levels) of rewards, of different values. In order to claim a particular reward, a 
crowdfunder must contribute at least as much, or more, than the value of said reward. Further, at most 
one reward can be claimed as compensation for a particular contribution. Following reward selection, 
contributors are then asked to provide an e-mail address and (if a perk is being claimed) a shipping 
address. 
 
      
 




Figure 3. Information Hiding Option 
 
At this point, the contributor is presented with a question about how they want their contribution record 
to appear on the campaign’s Funders tab. The contributor is given the option to conceal their identity or 
the amount of the contribution3. Figure 3 provides a screenshot depicting this question. Lastly, the 
contributor is then given an option to leave a comment on their contribution record, and to share their 
contribution via social media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook), before being taken to the payment-processing page 
where they complete the transaction (e.g., PayPal).
                                                             
3 Information-hiding mechanisms of this sort are relatively common in online crowdfunding. Some other prominent 
platforms that employ these features include GoFundMe.com, GiveForward.com, and CrowdRise.com. 
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In our first model, our outcome of interest is a three-value categorical variable capturing what we argue to 
be increasing degrees of information hiding: 0 – no hiding, 1 – amount hiding and 2 – identity hiding. 
These three possibilities are mutually exclusive – that is, it is not possible for contributors to hide both 
their identity and contribution amount simultaneously4. We view identity hiding as a more intense form 
of information hiding than amount hiding because this completely disassociates the contributor from 
their contribution.
 
The role of social norms in private contribution to a public good is well documented in the literature, as 
noted in our review above. However, unlike the prior literature, here, individuals are afforded the ability 
to control scrutiny, by opting to conceal their actions. Thus, as the literature supports the notion that 
individuals tend toward established norms when they perceive that they are being observed, here, we 
might expect, conversely, that individuals could also opt to conceal actions that constitute a deviation 
from an established norm. In more concrete terms, with more extreme contributions, one would expect 
greater information hiding behavior. We operationalize extremity here based on increasing size of the 
Contribution in question. We focus on large, rather than small, contributions because small contributions 
are very common in practice, and thus are less likely to be viewed as extreme. However, we subsequently 
explore alternative operationalizations for extreme contribution in our robustness checks, such as 
whether the amount of the contribution falls in the top or bottom 10% of the overall distribution. 
Next, in order to address the impact of contributors’ general attitude towards privacy, which, as noted in 
our literature review, has been shown to impact information revelation in a number of online settings, we 
include a dummy variable, Facebook Connected, which captures whether the contributor has connected 
their Facebook profile to their marketplace user account. This variable acts as a proxy for privacy 
sensitivity, as individuals who are willing to connect their Facebook profile in this manner are likely less 
concerned with privacy issues. Of course, given that this variable may correlate with other factors, we also 
consider robustness checks using an alternative measure of privacy concern, namely a binary indicator of 
whether the individual has chosen to (voluntarily) share their demographic info in their user profile. We 
obtain consistent results using either of these measures, indicating that our Facebook connectedness 
indicator is a valid proxy for privacy sensitivity. 
Related to the issue of privacy concerns, we also control for the degree of exposure a campaign has 
received via the Exposure variable, which is operationalized as the number of prior contributors the 
campaign has received as of a point in time. Given that a privacy sensitive reaction to increasing campaign 
exposure is likely dependent on individuals’ privacy sensitivity, we interact this exposure variable with the 
Facebook Connected dummy, in order to capture the anticipated moderating relationship. This aspect of 
our model reflects our expectation that contributors will perceive high profile campaigns as a greater risk 
from a privacy perspective.  
Lastly, we operationalize self-contribution using a binary indicator, Is Organizer. We also incorporate a 
series of fixed effects at the campaign level, , to control for unobserved heterogeneity between 
campaigns, as well as time fixed effects, , to control for unobservable shocks across time periods (e.g., 
privacy breaches covered in the mainstream media).   
Hypotheses H1 and H2 will be assessed via the coefficients associated with our Facebook Connected 
variable, and the interaction with our Exposure variable. H1 suggests a negative effect from Facebook 
connectivity—such users are expected to be less privacy sensitive, and thus less likely to conceal 
information. Further, H2 suggests that the interaction between Facebook Connected and Exposure will 
                                                             
4 While it is possible for a contributor to indicate that they are contributing on behalf of someone else and to then 
provide an alias, effectively making their donation completely anonymous, we exclude such contributions from our 
sample, due to their inherent ambiguity. 
δ
φ
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also be significant and negative, as the effects of privacy sensitivity are anticipated to be stronger in the 
presence of a larger audience. Hypothesis H3 will be evaluated via our Contribution variable, which we 
anticipate to have a significant and positive coefficient given that contributions are bounded at zero (i.e., 
the most extreme contributions are the large ones), and hypothesis H4 will be evaluated via the Is 
Organizer variable, which we similarly expect to have a positive coefficient. Our model of the antecedents 
of information hiding is presented below in Equation 1, in simple linear form, for the sake of exposition. 
We describe the components of this model in more detail below5. 
   
InfoHideijt = β0 +β1 *Log(Contributionijt )+β2 *FacebookConnectedi +
β3 *Log(Exposurejt )+β4 *FacebookConnectedi *Log(Exposurejt )+
β5 * IsOrganizerij +δ j +φt +εijt
           (1)
 
Consequences 
Next, we consider the consequences of information hiding in terms of its impact on later others’ 
contribution amounts, as well as its impact on the focal contribution. The economic outcome of interest in 
our model is the dollar amount supplied (i.e., Contribution). We detail the various independent variables 
in this model, below.  
Referring back to our literature review, we begin by addressing the issue of social comparison. As noted 
previously, a number of studies have reported evidence that individuals respond to observation of others 
contributions by increasing their generosity. Another framing for this relationship is that of an anchoring 
effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), where contributors, lacking an appropriate benchmark for what is 
fair, may refer to others’ recent contributions. 
To operationalize this potential anchoring effect (H5), we introduce a variable entitled Last Contribution, 
which captures the size of the most recent contribution to the campaign. Second, to capture potential 
variation in subsequent response due to information hiding on the part of the last contributor, we 
introduce a series of dummies (Last Name Hide and Last Amount Hide). Finally, we interact these 
dummies with the Last Contribution term, in order to assess hypothesis H66. 
Beyond these key variables, we again introduce a series of controls. These include an estimate of the 
contributor’s income, based upon their zip code – Income. This value is drawn from zip code level data 
about average taxable income for the year 2008, published by the IRS. It should be noted that one 
consequence of including this variable in our estimation is that we limit our analysis to only American 
contributors. Luckily, however, American contributors comprise the bulk of our data set (more than 70% 
of contributions). Further, however, we must acknowledge potential measurement error in this variable, 
given that crowdfunders represent a self-selected subset of the general population. It is possible that they 
deviate systematically from the average wealth in any given geographic region. For this reason, we 
consider alternative indicators of wealth in our robustness checks, namely the average prior contribution 
amount for the individual in question, finding comparable results. 
We also consider that some component of contribution in this setting may be due to altruism and warm 
glow. These incentives as drivers of private contribution to public goods have seen extensive consideration 
                                                             
5 State-stickiness may also play a role if contributors exhibit persistent behavior across contributions out of habit or 
comfort. Fortunately, this is not particularly concerning in our sample for two reasons. First, 82% of contributions 
came from first-time (one-time) contributors. For the remaining 18% of contributions, where correlated behavior is 
possible, we offer additional, specific robustness checks after our main results. 
6 It is worth clarifying our focus on the most recent contribution only. A contributor could conceivably refer to 
multiple prior contributions, or employ a mental estimate of their average. We focus on the most recent for two 
reasons. First, that piece of information is the most prominently displayed reference point for a given contributor, 
being displayed first, at the top of the backer list. Second, we do so as a simple matter of convenience. Moderated 
anchoring is a challenge to operationalize if we incorporate multiple prior contributions into the model. If we employ 
the average it is not clear how we should operationalize the influence of information hiding associated with the 
various contributions comprising that average. If we incorporate multiple prior contributions separately, in tandem, 
positive serial correlation between them produces issues of collinearity. 
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in the economics literature (Andreoni 1989; Andreoni 1990). Recently, however, these factors have also 
seen consideration and examination in the crowdfunding literature. In particular, Burtch et al. (2013c) 
present evidence of altruism and crowding out in a crowdfunded marketplace for online journalism 
projects. Bolstering this finding, Aitamurto (2011) also reports that these crowdfunders perceive their 
contributions as supporting a social good. Thus, as per Burtch et al. (2013c), we operationalize altruism’s 
effects by incorporating a measure of the degree to which the campaign “need” has already been met. 
Specifically, we focus on the campaign’s outstanding budget as of the time of contribution: Remaining 
Budget. This value represents the gap between the dollars raised and the target fundraising amount. 
Finally, we control for a contemporaneous effect of information hiding, bearing in mind that relative 
scrutiny can result in behavioral differences, as outlined in our literature review. Further, we once again 
incorporate fixed effects at the campaign level, as well as for time, to address unobservable heterogeneity 
between campaigns, and temporal trends such as seasonal effects (e.g., tax season may reduce disposable 
income). Finally, we include a relative time trend variable, Days Posted to capture effects such as 
diminishing contributions due to lost interest in a campaign, or increasing contributions due to nearing 
fundraiser deadlines. Equation 2 reflects our main consequences model, again indexed by contributor, 
campaign and time, or i, j and t, respectively. 
       
Log(Contributionijt ) = β0 +β1 *Log(LastContributionijt )+β2 *LastAmountHideijt +
β3 *LastNameHideijt +β4 *Log(LastContributionijt )*LastAmountHideijt +
β5 *Log(LastContributionijt )*LastNameHideijt +β6 *Log(Incomei )+
β7 * InfoHideijt +β8 *Log(RemainingBudget jt )+β9 *Log(DaysPosted jt )+δ j +φt +εijt
     (2) 
Endogeneity and Estimation Approach 
Our initial estimations employ a three-stage least squares (3sLS) estimator with time and campaign fixed 
effects (instituted via a within-transformation), as well as clustered robust standard errors. This choice of 
estimator is driven by the apparent endogeneity (simultaneity) in our models, because information hiding 
and contribution amounts are codetermined. Employing instruments for these endogenous regressors 
allows us to directly address this issue. We instrument for information hiding using our indicators of 
privacy sensitivity (i.e., Facebook connectivity, and demographic sharing), and we instrument for 
contribution amounts using our income estimate, the outstanding budget for the pitch in question and the 
average of past contribution behavior for the contributor in question. The logic behind the income 
instrument is that individuals with greater disposable income will be more likely to contribute in extreme 
(i.e., large) amounts.  
We opt to estimate these models in tandem using three stage least squares (3SLS) because this estimator 
offers efficiency gains over isolated 2SLS estimations for each component of the system. However, most 
packaged 3SLS estimators assume a cross-sectional sample, and thus do not account for issues of serial 
correlation or panel data structures (e.g., nested / cross-correlated data structures). In contrast, there are 
a number of readily available packaged 2SLS estimators that are capable of handling these issues. Further, 
Wooldridge (2002, pg 199) notes that 3SLS estimation is only robust when all equations in the system are 
appropriately specified. If even one equation is misspecified, then all estimates are inconsistent. Bearing 
this in mind, we explore the stability of our results with the use of a 2SLS estimator, as part of our 
robustness checks. 
We also acknowledge the unique characteristics and structure of some of our variables. In particular, our 
Info Hide variable is viewed as an ordered or nominal categorical variable. As such, alternative estimators 
may be called for, beyond those we employ in our main estimations, which assume a continuous outcome. 
Our robustness checks therefore include additional estimations employing Ordered and Multinomial 
Logit estimators. Finally, we consider a number of additional estimations, employing alternative 
operationalizations of our variables (some of which are noted above), as well as a number of data splits. 
These robustness checks help us to establish the robustness of our estimates under varying assumptions. 
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Data & Descriptive Statistics 
We are fortunate to have access to all recorded data that is associated with this marketplace, over an 8-
month period. Our dataset includes information associated with site-wide activity, pertaining to all 
campaigns, users and user behaviors, even when those behaviors are not publicly observable. We employ 
data associated with all campaigns on the platform, to ensure generalizability of our results. Table 1 
provides a list of variable definitions, and Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each.  
In terms of information hiding behavior, we find that it is quite prevalent. In particular, individuals 
withhold their name and contribution amount in 19% and 27% of contribution instances, respectively. In 
terms of which individuals tend to hide their information at the time of contribution, we see a number of 
interesting correlations. We observe a negative correlation between information hiding and Facebook 
connectedness (rho = -0.07), as well as a positive correlation between information hiding and i) the 
number of prior contributors (rho = 0.15). 
 
Results 
The results of our estimation are presented in Table 3. Looking at our Antecedents results in the upper 
panel, we see a number of expected significant coefficients. First, we see that individuals who are less 
privacy sensitive (i.e., have opted to connect their Facebook profile to their user account) are significantly 
less likely to hide information at the time of contribution, and that this effect is even more pronounced in 
campaigns that have received greater exposure (many prior contributors). These findings support 
hypotheses H1 and H2. We also see that individuals are significantly more likely to hide their information 
as they contribute in more extreme (larger) amounts, as well as when they are contributing to their own 
campaign. Together, these results support for hypotheses H3 and H4.  
 
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Info HideO A three value ordinal variable capturing the degree of information hiding 
exhibited by a contributor in a particular contribution instance. 
ContributionO The dollar amount supplied by this contributor. 
Facebook Connected A binary indicator of whether the contributor has connected their Facebook 
profile to their marketplace user account. 
Exposure The count of prior contributors to the campaign in question, as of time t. 
Last Name Hide A binary indicator of whether the last contributor hid their identity  
(i.e., contributor i-1). 
Last Amount Hide A binary indicator of whether the last contributor hid the amount of their 
contribution (i.e., contributor i-1). 
Is Organizer A binary indicator of whether the contributor is a campaign organizer. 
Last Contribution The dollar amount supplied by the last contributor (i.e., contributor i-1). 
Income The average reported taxable income in the contributor’s zip code, in 2008. 
Days Posted The number of days the campaign has been in the funding process. 
Remaining Budget The dollar amount outstanding toward the campaign’s fundraising target, as 
of time t. 
Notes: O – outcome variable. 
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Next, we consider our Consequences estimates in the lower panel, focusing first on our key variables, 
prior others’ contribution and information hiding. We find a significant positive coefficient associated 
with the prior contribution (notably, this effect persists when we remove the interaction terms), which 
supports the presence of an anchoring effect, hypothesis H5. Looking at the interaction with amount 
hiding, however, we also find that this effect is attenuated (indeed, effectively eliminated) when the prior 
amount is concealed. This interaction effect provides support for our final hypothesis, H6. This result 
suggests that the positive effect from prior contribution is not due to homophily (Manski 1993), because 
we would expect the correlation in contributions to persist when prior amounts are concealed, if that were 
the case.  
Finally, in terms of our control variables, we first find a positive effect from outstanding budget. This 
suggests that many contributors are driven by altruism or warm-glow, offering greater contributions when 
the campaign’s need is greater7. Importantly, this finding is consistent with the results of Burtch et al. 
(2013c). We also find a positive effect from income. That is, individuals with greater disposable wealth 
contribute in greater amounts, on average. Finally, we find that individuals are more likely to contribute 
in extreme amounts when they have opted to conceal more information from public view. This is not 
unexpected, given our results in the Antecedent model demonstrating a positive association between 
contribution amounts and information hiding.  
We subsequently explored the marginal effects of amount hiding, in order to determine its net effect at 
various points in the distribution of prior contribution amounts. Rather intuitively, we found that amount 
hiding is desirable from the platform purveyor’s and fundraiser’s perspective when the amount 
contributed is small, as this effectively conceals a benchmark that is likely to pull down subsequent 
contributions. Conversely, amount hiding is detrimental when the contribution amount is large, as such 
contributions have the potential to “pull up” subsequent contributions. Bearing this in mind, we surmise 
that the purveyor and campaign organizers would possibly benefit from using varied information hiding 
defaults, conditional on the size of the associated contribution. If small contribution amounts were 
                                                             
7 If we operationalize peer effects using cumulative amount raised, rather than budget outstanding, and we then 
incorporate a control for possible payoff externalities as per Zhang and Liu (2012), we find very similar results. 
Cumulative contribution has a negative effect, suggesting crowding out, and our other coefficients remain generally 
stable. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Median STDev. 
Info Hide 0.00 2.00 0.66 0.00 0.78 
Contribution 1.00 60,000.00 64.51 25.00 208.59 
Facebook Connected 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.00 0.36 
Exposure 0.00 32,323.00 1,875.06 31.00 5,597.76 
Last Name Hide 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.00 0.39 
Last Amount Hide 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.00 0.44 
Is Organizer 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 
Last Contribution 0.00 12,084.00 61.15 40.00 105.88 
IncomeX 1,575.20 5,176,136.00 58,623.82 43,536.96 53,926.12 
Days Posted 0.00 120.00 17.65 10.00 19.52 
Remaining Budget -698,903.00 5,000,000.00 -23,550.00 2,700.00 140,700.70 
Notes: x – N = 179,746, all others – N = 352,575 
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concealed by default, and larger contributions were revealed by default, we anticipate that overall 
contribution volumes would increase in the market. 
The economic significance of these effects is quite large as well. Based on a linear probability model we 
estimated, where we collapsed the amount and identity hiding outcomes into a single value, which we 
term simply Hiding, we observed that a 50% increase in contribution amount drives a 2% increase in the 
probability that some piece of information will be concealed. Conversely, a shift from revealed to 
concealed contribution is associated with a 150% increase in contribution amounts. These effects are 























Following our main estimations, we conducted a wide variety of robustness checks, beyond ruling out 
issues of multicollinearity and outliers (note: we exclude these estimations in light of space limitations). 
First, as noted in our modeling section, we evaluated the robustness of our estimates to the use of panel 
fixed effect 2SLS, finding virtually identical results.  
Next, we considered the impact of possible differences in contributor motivations. In particular, we 
considered systematic differences between individuals who claim a reward in exchange for their 
contributions, and those who do not (e.g., different motivations for contributing). One concern might be 
that the amount contributed by a reward-claiming user could be driven in large part by the value of the 
reward they wish to claim. Further, such users may be particularly less concerned with other users on the 
platform, because they are not contributing to gain social benefits (e.g., reputation, social capital). To 
address this possibility, we re-estimated our Antecedents and Consequences models using only those 
Table 3. Antecedents & Consequences Results (3SLS-FE) 
 
Dependent Variable Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
Info Hide Log(Contribution) 0.21*** (0.02) 
 Facebook Connected -0.11*** (0.02) 
 Log(Exposure) 0.01** (0.00) 
 
Facebook Connected       
          X Log(Exposure) 
-0.02** (0.00) 
 Is Organizer 0.36*** (0.02) 
Log(Contribution) Log(Last Contribution) 0.01*** (0.00) 
 Last Name Hide -0.02 (0.02) 
 Last Amount Hide 0.05** (0.02) 
 
Log(Last Contribution)   
           X Last Name Hide 
0.01 (0.02) 
 
Log(Last Contribution)   
           X Last Amount Hide 
-0.01** (0.00) 
 Log(Remaining Budget) 0.01*** (0.00) 
 Log(Days Posted) 0.00 (0.00) 
 Log(Income) 0.14*** (0.00) 
 Info Hide 0.63*** (0.03) 
Notes: Fixed effects instituted via within transformation; we exclude estimates of 
time effects for the sake of brevity. 
          *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01. 
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observations where the contributor did not collect a reward for their contribution. The results of these 
estimations were effectively identical to those reported above. 
As noted in a footnote in our modeling section, we also examined the role of state-stickiness in 
information hiding behavior (correlations across contribution actions for a given contributor). Given that 
82% of contributions we observe were proffered by one-time contributors, we focus here on the remaining 
18% of repeat contributors. Looking at this subsample, we incorporated an indicator of the contributor’s 
information hiding decision in the prior contribution instance. We found a strong positive effect (i.e., Beta 
= 0.46, p < 0.001) from this indicator, suggesting that habit formation or comfort may play a role in the 
information hiding decision. However, most notably, our various other coefficients remained stable in the 
presence of this additional control8.  
We next considered our approach to operationalizing ‘extreme contribution’. In particular, rather than 
focusing only on larger contributions, we re-estimated a model in which extreme contribution was 
operationalized based on the top and bottom 10% of the distribution, which equates to those 
contributions that were either equal to $1, or which were greater than $99. This estimation produced very 
similar results to those reported above. Our binary indicator for extreme contribution had a significant 
and positive effect on information hiding (Beta = 0.06, p < 0.001). In terms of the economic significance, 
extreme contribution based on this definition was associated with a 4% increase in the probability that 
some piece of information would be hidden. 
We also explored the sensitivity of our results to the choice of estimator—i.e., explicitly accounting for the 
categorical nature of our Info Hide variable. We re-estimated our Antecedents model using a Random 
Effects Ordinal Logit estimator, in tandem with a first stage prediction of our endogenous contribution 
amount variable to address simultaneity. This estimation produced results that closely paralleled those of 
our main estimation. Similarly, we considered a Multinomial Logit estimator with instruments and 
random coefficients for campaigns. This estimation allowed for the possibility of different drivers between 
identity and amount hiding. However, except for some small differences, the output paralleled much of 
our initial results as well. We saw that more extreme contribution was positively associated with both 
Amount and Identity hiding and that Facebook connectivity was negatively associated with both 
behaviors. This indicates that our initial choice of estimator is rather appropriate. 
As a final measure, we considered some alternative operationalizations of some independent variables 
and instruments, replacing Exposure with a binary indicator of whether the campaign was featured by the 
purveyor on the home page, and replacing Facebook connectedness, which might correlate with other 
factors aside from privacy concern, with a binary indicator of whether individuals had previously chosen 
to reveal their year of birth in their platform profile (a voluntary, conscious choice). Finally, we tried 
replacing Income, which is a zip-code value that may introduce measurement error, with the average prior 
contribution amount for the user in question, though we only have this data for repeat contributors (18% 
of our panel). In each case, the alternative measures produced very similar results in terms of signs and 
significance, suggesting that our main measures are indeed valid.  
Discussion & Future Research 
Our finding that individuals are more likely to hide information when they behave in the extreme is as 
anticipated. However, additional details about the nature of this effect could prove useful. Which users are 
more likely to deviate in which direction, and to what degree? One likely driver of information hiding is 
the presence of a social tie between the contributor and campaign organizer. Consider that crowdfunders 
wishing to maintain social capital or reputation might be more concerned about scrutiny. A wide variety 
of interesting factors such as this would be worth exploring in the future.  
In general, it is interesting to consider the possibility that the relationship between privacy sensitivity, 
exposure, extreme behavior and information hiding may vary with contributors’ motivations and 
                                                             
8 This estimation incorporates additional individual heterogeneity into our models, which we admit is somewhat 
lacking. Unfortunately, we cannot introduce contributor-level fixed effects because the majority of our sample is 
comprised of one-time contributors. Further, even if we could do so, this would preclude identification of certain key 
(static) variables in our models.  
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incentives for contributing. As noted in our robustness checks section, we considered the possibility that 
reward-claiming contributors might behave very differently than contributors who give money out of a 
desire for reputation, social capital or other such social incentives. Accordingly, we repeated our 
estimations excluding such users. However, when we focus explicitly on these users, we still see the same 
general results. As contribution amount grows more extreme, information hiding is more prevalent. 
Privacy sensitive users are more likely to conceal and the effect is increasing in Exposure. There is one 
interesting exception, however. We see that Exposure’s main effect is significant and negative. This 
suggests that reward-claiming users are perhaps comforted by broader market approval for a campaign. 
This may be because such users worry more about market approval, as a quality signal, and less about the 
implications of exposure for scrutiny. 
In terms of the impact that information controls have on contribution behavior, beyond the impact on 
subsequent contribution (via an anchoring effect), individuals’ ability to withhold information about 
“undesirable” behavior has both positive and negative implications, conceptually. Although providing 
anonymity mechanisms is likely to increase participation, as users need not fear judgment (Goldfarb et al. 
2012), it also may enable gaming, as campaign organizers can easily support their own projects 
unbeknownst to others, sending a false signal of campaign quality.  
Our Consequences results highlight the impacts of information hiding for social comparison. Specifically, 
our results indicate that information revelation will be more desirable from the campaigners’ and 
purveyors’ perspectives, depending upon the size of prior contribution. Again, this finding suggests that a 
more nuanced approach to the provision and application of information hiding mechanisms is called for. 
This implication is interesting, as it provides a concrete example of how one might design a web platform 
to foster social comparison only when it is most desirable, a notion only recently raised in the literature 
(Roels and Su 2013). 
The above being said, one particular concern with instituting policy changes based on these findings is 
that the identified effects are conditional on contribution (i.e., participation). That is, these analyses do 
not speak to the possibility that mere participation would decline were policy or design changes imposed 
in the marketplace. Notably, prior work examining the role of anonymity mechanisms in online 
communities has found that posting frequency declined by as much as 25% after the removal of such 
features (Kilner and Hoadley 2005; Leshed 2008). Thus, any changes to the user interface or platform 
design, in response to these results, would need to be taken with care and validated via experimentation. 
As a final point of discussion, it is worth pointing out that we have focused primarily on the relationship 
between extreme contributions and information hiding. It would also be interesting to perhaps explore 
the antecedents and consequences of self-contribution by campaign organizers. This behavior is fairly 
prevalent on the platform – we observe 8,514 self-contributions out of the total 352,575 (roughly 2.5%). 
Since it is likely that this behavior can instigate negative reactions from the crowd, it is interesting to note 
that the contributor’s identity is only concealed approximately 50% of the time. This seems to suggest that 
there are certain situations in which the campaign organizer is comfortable revealing this action. 
Accordingly, we plan to explore the conditions under which a campaign organizer is less (or more) likely 
to conceal their self-contributions. Further, we also plan to explore what impact observable self-
contribution has on subsequent fundraising. At the moment, however, such analyses lie outside the scope 
of this work. 
Conclusion 
This work presents, what is to our knowledge, a first attempt to evaluate individuals’ use of information 
hiding mechanisms at the transaction level, to conceal discrete behaviors, in a real-world setting. Whereas 
past work has explored individuals’ behavior in response to exogenously imposed anonymity, here, we 
consider a user’s endogenous decision to conceal information about themselves or their actions. Further, 
we have undertaken this evaluation in a particularly novel context – the burgeoning industry of online 
crowdfunding.  
With the emergence of “crowdfunding” as a viable business model, marketplaces of this sort are now 
providing users with the opportunity to express themselves in new ways, and to examine others’ behavior 
in new ways. Given crowdfunding’s significant economic potential and recent growth as an industry, any 
increases in welfare or marketplace efficiency that can be achieved through modifications to the design of 
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these platforms or their policies should be pursued wholeheartedly. Our work presents a solid first step in 
that direction. It is our hope that this work will provide insights to scholars and practitioners, informing 
design, as well as policy and regulation going forward. (Chamberlain 1980) 
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